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Dynamics of brain activity reveal a unitary recognition signal
Christoph T. Weidemann
Swansea University & University of Pennsylvania
Michael J. Kahana
University of Pennsylvania
Dual-process models of recognition memory typically assume that independent familiarity and
recollection signals with distinct temporal profiles can each lead to recognition (enabling two
routes to recognition), whereas single-process models posit a unitary “memory strength” sig-
nal. Using multivariate classifiers trained on spectral EEG features, we quantified neural evi-
dence for recognition decisions as a function of time. Classifiers trained on a small portion of
the decision period performed similarly to those also incorporating information from previous
time points indicating that neural activity reflects an integrated evidence signal. We propose a
single-route account of recognition memory that is compatible with contributions from famil-
iarity and recollection signals, but relies on a unitary evidence signal that integrates all available
evidence.
A repeated exposure to people or objects sometimes
evokes only a vague sense of familiarity; at others, it elic-
its vivid recollections of contextual details from previous en-
counters. This distinction is formalized in dual-process mod-
els of recognition memory that posit two independent types
of evidence subserving recognition decisions (with recollec-
tion commonly, but not always, conceptualized as a thresh-
old process; Diana, Reder, Arndt, & Park, 2006; Yoneli-
nas, 2002; Yonelinas, Aly, Wang, & Koen, 2010; Malmberg,
2008). In apparent support of these models, neuroscientific
studies of recognition memory have identified patterns of
brain activity with distinct time courses thought to reflect an
early familiarity signal (peaking around 400 ms after onset
of a memory probe) and a later recollection signal (peaking
around 600 ms after probe onset; Curran, 1999; Rugg & Cur-
ran, 2007).
Most dual-process models assume that familiarity and
recollection signals can each separately lead to recognition
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(Reder et al., 2000). In some models, however, the memory
system integrates evidence from different sources into a uni-
tary evidence signal (Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004;
Wixted & Mickes, 2010). This results in a single route to
recognition despite the contributions from different types of
evidence. From this perspective, such models are concep-
tually similar to single-process models which assume only
a single evidence source (Malmberg, 2008). One indication
that two separate routes to recognition may not be neccesary
to account for recognition performance is the fact that single-
process models have been highly successful at accounting
for intricate relationships between response time distribu-
tions, accuracy, and confidence ratings across a wide range
of experimental manipulations (e.g., Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff
& Starns, 2009; Wixted, 2007; Dunn, 2004, 2008; Cox
& Shiffrin, 2012; Diller, Nobel, & Shiffrin, 2001; Starns,
White, & Ratcliff, 2012; Starns & Ratcliff, 2014; Shiffrin
& Steyvers, 1997). Additionally, recent work linking brain
activity to parameters in a single-process model of recogni-
tion memory has cast doubt on the common interpretation of
early and late electrophysiological signals indexing familiar-
ity and recollection respectively (Ratcliff, Sederberg, Smith,
& Childers, 2016, but see also Anderson, Zhang, Borst, &
Walsh, 2016, and Borst & Anderson, 2015, for an alternative
approach that preserves this interpretation—we will return to
this issue in the discussion).
Because the single- vs. dual-process labels do not reliably
differentiate between the number of routes to recognition, we
will refer to models as single- or dual-route models to make
this distinction explicit. Specifically, we label models that as-
sume that different types of evidence can give rise to different
kinds of recognition decisions (e.g., Yonelinas, 1994, 1997;
Reder et al., 2000; Diana et al., 2006) as dual-route models.
Single-route models are those that assume a single type of
evidence source (e.g., Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997) and those
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that assume that evidence from multiple sources/processes is
integrated into a unitary evidence signal (e.g., Rotello et al.,
2004; Wixted & Mickes, 2010). Within the framework of
dual-route models, it makes sense to label individual recogni-
tion decisions with respect to the type of evidence (e.g., “fa-
miliarity” vs. “recollection”) that gave rise to them, whereas
such a categorization of individual recognition memory deci-
sions is not meaningful within the framework of single-route
models, because information from all available sources con-
tributes to recognition decisions. We propose that conflating
the question about the number of recognition signals (i.e., the
distinction between single- vs. dual-process models) with the
question about the number of different routes to recognition
may have contributed to the apparent disconnect between the
evidence for separate familiarity and recollection signals and
the success of single-process models.
Capitalizing on the presumed temporal separation of fa-
miliarity and recollection signals (Diana et al., 2006), we
quantify the neural evidence distinguishing targets from lures
in various partitions of the period leading up to the recogni-
tion decision. Specifically, we ask if combining neural ev-
idence from multiple time bins during the recognition deci-
sion tells us more about whether an item has been studied
than just the latest considered time bin by itself. If we are
picking up on independent signals at different points in the
recognition decision, then combining information from both
should boost our ability to use neural activity to distinguish
between old and new items. If, however, the neural signal
corresponds to an integrated/unitary evidence signal, infor-
mation from previous time points should not contain infor-
mation that is not also present in the neural activity at later
points.
Figure 1 illustrates our approach with the help of two
toy models of evidence in recognition memory. Figure 1A
shows activation for two sources of evidence containing in-
formation about the old/new status of an item as a function
of time, and Figure 1B shows two alternative ways these
sources could give rise to an evidence signal for the recog-
nition decision (in this toy example we assume an “early”
and a “late” source, analogous to the presumed dynamics of
familiarity and recollection signals). The top panel of Fig-
ure 1B illustrates a dual-route model: the recognition de-
cision is based exclusively on whichever source has accu-
mulated more evidence at the time of response. Thus any
information from the non-dominant evidence source is lost.
Assuming sources with different temporal signatures, the ev-
idence signal will initially be determined by activity from
the early source, which sometimes will be exceeded by ac-
tivity from the later source by the time the response is initi-
ated. The bottom panel of Figure 1B illustrates a single route
model: here the evidence for the recognition memory deci-
sion at any given time reflects the information accrued across
all sources so far. Even when the relative contributions of the
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Figure 1. (A) Probability density functions (PDFs) illustrat-
ing two sources of evidence for recognition memory deci-
sions. (B) Cumulative density functions (CDFs) for the PDFs
shown in (A) along with CDFs for the evidence on which
the recognition memory decision is based. The top panel
illustrates a case where the evidence is determined by a sin-
gle source of evidence leading to different routes to recog-
nition memory depending on which source determines the
evidence signal at the time of response (in the case of two
sources, we label this class of models “dual-route models”).
The bottom panel illustrates a case where the evidence signal
integrates information from all sources (we label this class
of models “single-route models” regardless of the number of
sources contributing to the evidence). (C) Expected patterns
of performance for classifiers trained on features from indi-
vidual (I) or cumulative (C) time bins partitioning the time
between probe onset and recognition response (see text for
details). Assuming the sources contribute independent in-
formation with distinct dynamics, dual-route models predict
diverging performance for classifiers trained on individual
and cumulative time bins (top panel), whereas single-route
models predict identical performance (bottom panel; C and
I lines are overlapping). AUC indicates area under the re-
ceiver operating characteristic curve, a measure of classifier
performance.
different sources change, no information is lost, because all
relevant information contributes to the evidence signal.
It is difficult to distinguish between these alternative ac-
counts on the basis of recognition decisions alone, because
these presumably only reflect a snapshot of the evidence sig-
nal from around the time when the response was initiated.
Recordings of brain activity, however, allow us to assess
the evolution of a neural evidence signal in the lead-up to a
recognition response. We used multivariate (“machine learn-
ing”) classifiers to quantify the neural evidence distinguish-
ing between targets and lures during the processing of the
probe (i.e., between probe onset and just prior to the execu-
tion of a response). By comparing performance for classifiers
trained on neural features from various partitions of this time
period, we can make inferences about whether relevant infor-
mation is integrated into a single evidence signal or whether
evidence from an earlier signal is sometimes lost.
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Figure 1C illustrates the logic of the main analyses. As ex-
plained in the Methods section, we partition each recognition
decision into time bins and train classifiers either on individ-
ual time bins or on a cumulatively increasing number of time
bins. If brain activity reflects different evidence signals that
contribute independent information at different time points,
then performance of a classifier trained on neural features
from multiple time bins should exceed that of a classifier
trained on features from a single time point, since it is able to
capitalize on the information from distinct evidence signals
(top panel of Figure 1C). If, on the other hand, the neural evi-
dence signal integrates information from all sources, then the
signals from previous time points do not contain additional
information. Thus, we would expect no benefit for classifiers
trained on neural features from multiple time bins in that case
(lower panel of Figure 1C).
Materials and methods
Participants
The current data set of 132 participants is a subset of the
data set for which we previously presented analyses of overt
responses (Weidemann & Kahana, 2016; basic analyses of
recognition accuracy and response times are repeated here
for this subset). Each participant provided informed consent
and all procedures were approved by the Institutional Re-
view Board of the University of Pennsylvania. We selected
those participants who completed 20 sessions of various free
recall tasks. The availability of data from 20 sessions for
each participant enabled us to train statistical classifiers on
individual participants’ data from 19 sessions (holding out
data from one session for cross-validation of classifier per-
formance). As described below, we did this repeatedly such
that data from each session was held out once (a leave-one-
session-out cross-validation procedure) and all classifier per-
formance measures are based on these held-out sessions only.
This yielded enough data to train non-linear classifiers even
in cases where not all trials contributed to the classification
(as detailed below, some of our analyses placed restrictions
on response times).
Experimental task
As part of a large-scale study of episodic memory, we
asked participants at the end of each of 20 sessions to make
recognition memory decisions and confidence ratings about
words that had been presented earlier in the session for study
in various free recall tasks. In each session, participants stud-
ied between 12 and 16 lists of 16 words that were each pre-
sented for 3 s followed by 0.8–1.2 s of interstimulus interval.
In some sessions participants were asked to provide a size
or animacy judgment for each word (see Lohnas & Kahana,
2013, for a detailed description of the methods for these ses-
sions) and some sessions included distractor tasks between
items and/or between lists. At the end of each list, partici-
pants were given 75 s to recall items in any order. A subset
of 80 participants were additionally instructed to say aloud
any words that were salient during the recall phases follow-
ing study lists in 6 of the 20 sessions (i.e., an externalized
free recall procedure). Some sessions additionally included
a final free recall phase after the recall phase for the last list
in the sessions. For this final free recall phase, participants
were given 5 minutes to recall items from any of the pre-
vious lists (for analyses that condition on recall status, we
considered recalls from both phases, but recalls during final
free recall phases mostly repeated recalls from recall phases
immediately following study lists). The recognition test al-
ways followed at the end of the session and consisted of 320
probes of which 80%, 75%, 62.5%, or 50% were targets (i.e.,
words that had been studied in any of the previous lists in the
current session) and the rest previously unstudied lure words.
The effect of the manipulation varying the proportion of tar-
gets vs. lures was small and is not further analyzed here (as
detailed below, the training of classifiers took the baserates
of the stimulus classes into account to avoid bias).
Throughout the experiment, we obtained high-density
EEG recordings, allowing us to investigate brain activity as
it unfolds during processing of a memory probe. Each recog-
nition memory trial consisted of the presentation of a probe
word, which required a verbal response to the question of
whether the given item had been previously studied. We
asked participants to substitute “pess” and “po” for “yes” and
“no” when answering this question in order to facilitate de-
termination of response times on the basis of the onset of the
verbal response (we excluded trials with response times be-
low 300 ms and above 3000 ms from further analyses). Fol-
lowing each binary recognition memory decision, we asked
participants to indicate their confidence in the response on
a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 indicating the highest level of
confidence and 1 indicating low confidence. Most partici-
pants indicated confidence ratings verbally; any reference to
response times in this manuscript is with respect to the binary
recognition decision and not for the confidence ratings. Af-
ter each classification and confidence rating response, partic-
ipants pressed the space bar (the recognition response times
were determined on the basis of the onset of the verbal recog-
nition decision, however). Following a uniformly randomly
jittered interval between 100 and 200 ms after the space-bar
press following the confidence rating, participants received
visual and auditory feedback on their recognition decision
(automatically generated by custom speech recognition soft-
ware). A 800–1200 ms (uniformly randomly jittered) blank
screen separated the offset of the feedback from the presen-
tation of the following recognition probe.
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Data availability
De-identified data and analysis code used in this
study may be freely downloaded from the authors’ web-
sites (http://cogsci.info and http://memory.psych
.upenn.edu/Electrophysiological_Data).
EEG data collection and processing
EEG data were recorded with 129 channel Geodesic Sen-
sor Nets using the Netstation acquisition environment (Elec-
trical Geodesics, Inc.). Cz was used as a reference during
recording, but all recordings were converted to an average
reference oﬄine. For most recording sessions, the EEG aqui-
sition software logged periods where the signal changed by
more than 250 µV within a short time period as artifactual.
Channels where any such period exceeded 10 min. were ex-
cluded from the average reference. The multivariate classi-
fiers (described below) weight neural features on the basis of
their respective signal to noise ratios and we evaluated their
performance by cross-validating on held-out data. Thus we
did not attempt to further identify or remove any artifactual
activity for our classifier analyses. However, we did exclude
twenty-six electrodes that were placed on the face (rather
than the scalp) from further analyses.
For event-related potential (ERP) analyses (Figure 2), we
excluded channels with low absolute correlation with all
other channels and those with extreme levels of raw or log-
transformed variance both from the average reference and
from the ERPs (we used z-scores of ±3 as exclusion thresh-
olds). Additionally we excluded events with significant eye-
movement artifacts from the ERP analyses (exclusion criteria
were amplitudes in excess of 3 times the inter-quartile range
on channels around the eyes any time from 100 ms prior to
probe onset until 1000 ms after probe onset).
EEG data were partitioned into events starting 500 ms
before the onset of a test item and ending 100 ms be-
fore the onset of the verbal recognition response. We ap-
plied a time-frequency decomposition using Morlet wavelets
with 5 cycles for 15 log-spaced frequencies between 2 and
200 Hz, log-transformed the resulting power values, and z-
transformed these within session. We chose this wide range
of frequencies to ensure that we comprehensively capture
signals associated with cognitive processes. By separately
z-transforming power for each frequency within each ses-
sion, we removed the variability due to baseline power-levels
across frequencies and sessions. The multivariate classifier
(described in detail below) could then weight power at each
frequency, electrode, and time-point according to its predic-
tive value. As is shown in Figure 3, power across all frequen-
cies in the range that covaried with the status of the probe
item.
We used a 1500 ms buffer at the beginning of the events
and mirrored the last 1500 ms at the end of each event to
avoid edge artifacts and to prevent EEG activity from pe-
riods during the verbal recognition memory response from
bleeding into the analyzed time bins (Cohen, 2014). With the
exception of 13 sessions across 5 participants (out of a total
of 2640 sessions across all 132 participants) where data were
accidentally recorded at 250 Hz, EEG was initially sampled
at 500 Hz and down-sampled to 100 Hz after wavelet trans-
formation. We then discarded samples before the onset of
the test items, resampled power values for each event to 360
samples, and averaged these samples into 36 equal-time bins
for the univariate analyses (Figure 3) and into six equal-time
bins for the multivariate classifiers. The lengths of the indi-
vidual time bins were identical within each trial, but, because
response times varied across trials, so did the lengths of the
(“vincentized”; Ratcliff, 1979) time bins. We chose to fix
the number of time bins to allow us to compare the neural
signals across trials as a function of the proportion of each
trial’s response time, but we also present some complemen-
tary analyses using fixed-length (100 ms) time bins below. To
aid with interpretation, whenever reasonable, figures show
mean times associated with time bins rather than indicating
the corresponding ordinal time bin numbers.
Classification of EEG data
We used the scikit-learn library (Pedregosa et al., 2011)
to train support vector machine classifiers with a radial basis
function (RBF) kernel for each participant using a leave-one-
session-out cross-validation procedure (all reported classifier
results represent the combined performance of 20 models for
each participant, where each of these models was trained on
19 lists and tested on the held-out list). The RBF kernel takes
the form K(u, v) = exp(−γ||u − v||2), where u and v are fea-
ture vectors and γ is a free parameter specifying the width
of the Gaussian RBF kernel that determines the region of
influence of any support vector. For very large values of γ
(corresponding to a small variance of the Gaussian kernel)
the support vectors are minimally affected by other training
examples leading to a highly complex model that is prone to
overfitting. Very low values of γ (corresponding to a large
variance of the Gaussian kernel) make each support vector
highly dependent on the entire training set and thus result in
highly constrained models. The default setting for γ in scikit-
learn’s svm.SVC class (using the “gamma=auto” option in
its constructor) is to set γ to 1/nF , where nF is the number of
features—we used this setting for all of our fits. Scaling γ by
the number of features counteracts the increased danger of
over-fitting with increasing numbers of features by adjusting
each support vectors region of influence to account for larger
expected distances between feature vectors as the number of
dimensions increase.
The z-transformed log-power values across all frequencies
and electrodes served as features for the multivariate classi-
fiers. We performed the z-transformation separately for each
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frequency and within each session and thus this transforma-
tion was completely separate for training and testing data.
These features came either from individual time bins or from
varying ranges of time bins starting with the first time bin
(bins 1–2, bins 1–3, bins 1–4, etc.). We refer to classifiers
trained on features from individual time bins as “individual”
classifiers and to classifiers trained on features from multi-
ple consecutive time bins starting with the first time bin as
“cumulative” classifiers.
In addtion to the γ parameter that specifies the width of the
RBF kernel (discussed above), a separate regularization pa-
rameter (C in scikit-learn, in other contexts parameters with
this function are often labeled α or λ) determines the width
of the margin between the two classes which relates to the
tolerance for miss-classifying training exemplars. We used
the default setting for this parameter (C = 1.0) for all our
fits. Because the number of exemplars in each class varied
from session to session (as described in the methods the pro-
portion of targets varied between 50% and 80%), we set up
the classifiers such that the weights were adjusted inversely
proportional to class frequencies (using “balanced” as input
to the “class_weight” keyword for the constructor to scikit-
learn’s svm.SVC class). This resulted in the regularization
parameter (C) for each class, i, to be set to nS /(2ni), where
nS is the number of samples and ni is the number of items
in class i. This prevented the classifiers from being biased
towards predicting the most frequenct class.
For the classification of features from 100 ms time bins,
we only included trials where responses occurred 750 ms or
more after probe onset and only included the 100 (out of 132)
participants with at least 30 such trials in each session. Be-
cause we considered the time bin starting at probe onset, as
well as 11 additional time bins that each had a 50 ms overlap
with the previous time bin, this ensured that the last time bin
(ending 650 ms after the probe onset) was separated from
the response by at least 100 ms. These restrictions did not
apply to classifiers using variable-length time bins which we
applied to the entire recognition periods until 100 ms before
response onset for all 132 participants.
Results
Traditionally, researchers have averaged voltage time se-
ries from EEG recordings to obtain ERPs whose peaks and
troughs can be compared across conditions (Luck, 2005).
Figure 2A shows “early” (0.3–0.4 s) and “late” ERP (0.5–0.6
s) contrasts for comparisons between correctly recognized
targets (“hits”) that were previously recalled (R) and correct
rejections (CR), between previously unrecalled (U) hits and
CRs, as well as between R and U trials. Even though there
is considerable variability in the topography and timing of
such ERP contrasts in the literature (Paller, Lucas, & Voss,
2012), the pattern of the contrasts between hits and CRs is
broadly similar to that of comparable contrasts in other ex-
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Figure 2. (A) Early (0.3–0.4 s) and late (0.5–0.6 s) ERP dif-
ference effects for the contrasts between recalled hits (R) and
correct rejections (CR; top row), unrecalled hits (U) and CRs
(middle row) and between R and U (bottom row). Positive t-
values (red) correspond to more positive ERPs for R, U, and
R trials, respectively. For each contrast we used a permuta-
tion test to limit the family-wise error rate across both time
bins to 5% and set t-values for contrasts that did not exceed
the critical t-values to 0. For electrodes where all partici-
pants contributed to the contrast the corresponding degrees
of freedom were 131, but because we excluded data from
some electrodes that appeared noisy in a given participant,
this number represents an upper bound. (B) ERPs for R, U,
and CR trials at electrode Cz (on the top of the head). Points
below the ERPs indicate time points where the R vs. CR, the
U vs. CR, and the R vs. U contrasts were significant which
each contrast limiting the family-wise error rate across all
electrodes and time points to 5% using a permutation test.
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periments (Burns, Tree, & Weidemann, 2014; Danker et al.,
2008). Consistent with the traditional interpretation of recog-
nition ERPs as reflecting an early familiarity signal and a
late recollection signal (Wilding & Ranganath, 2012), ERPs
at both time intervals distinguished hits from CRs and the
topography of these contrasts differed across these intervals
(Figure 2A). Studies of testing effects in recognition mem-
ory have suggested that previous recall of an item selectively
enhances recollection in a recognition memory test (Chan &
McDermott, 2007). To the extent that this conclusion holds,
the fact that the difference in ERP contrasts for previously
recalled vs. previously unrecalled hits was particularly pro-
nounced for the late interval, further supports the interpreta-
tion of late ERP contrasts as reflecting a recollective signal.
Figure 2B illustrates this pattern in in individual ERPs for
R, U, and CR trials recorded at electrode Cz (at the top of
the head): ERPs for hits and CRs separate early and remain
separated for hundreds of ms, with ERPs for R and U trials
only separating later.
ERPs mainly reflect phase-locked low-frequency power of
the underlying EEG activity and are less sensitive to other
spectral features that have been shown to reflect cognitive
processes involved in episodic memory (Nyhus & Curran,
2010; Jacobs, Hwang, Curran, & Kahana, 2006). For all of
our remaining analyses, we therefore decomposed the EEG
signal into power across a wide range of frequencies. Ad-
ditionally later time points in traditional ERP analyses fre-
quently overlap with response periods. To avoid analyzing
neural activity associated with executing the recognition re-
sponse, we only analyzed brain activity up to 100 ms before
the onset of this response and used a mirrored buffer that pre-
vented any later brain activity from leaking into the analyzed
time period (Cohen, 2014; see Methods for details).
Power contrasts
Given that previous recall of an item has been linked to se-
lectively enhanced recollection (Chan & McDermott, 2007),
we aimed to identify any signals reflecting recollective pro-
cesses by contrasting spectral power for previously recalled
and previously unrecalled hits. Figure 3A shows the dynamic
patterns of these contrasts for sensors in two regions of inter-
est (ROIs) that have been frequently used in EEG investi-
gations of familiarity and recollection (Schwikert & Curran,
2014) with both ROIs yielding broadly similar contrasts.
To directly track neural evidence distinguishing old from
new items, we also calculated contrasts between spectral
power for targets and lures irrespective of the subsequent re-
sponse. Figure 3B shows that the pattern of these contrasts
was remarkably similar to those for contrasts between pre-
viously recalled and not previously recalled hits (shown in
Figure 3A). Under the assumption that memory is strongest
for previously recalled targets, weaker for not previously re-
called targets, and weakest/absent for lures, the patterns in
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Figure 3. Differences in power for previously recalled vs.
not previously recalled hits (A) and for all targets vs. lures ir-
respective of response (B). Left and right panels show these
differences for anterior and posterior ROIs (illustrated in the
middle panels) respectively across frequencies and vincen-
tized time bins (mean times associated with some of the time
bins are indicated on the abscissas). We used t-values for
the differences between trial categories for each participant
to calculate t-values across participants. Red shades indicate
higher power for previously recalled hits (A) or for all targets
(B) and blue shades indicate higher power for not previously
recalled hits (A) or for lures (B; within each panel, values
that did not reach statistical significance with a false discov-
ery rate of .05 are set to white).
Figure 3 could reflect a single memory strength signal that
falls out of any contrast between two conditions that vary in
memory strength (Squire, Wixted, & Clark, 2007). The fact
that these patterns changed quite drastically in the lead-up to
the memory decisions, however, might also reflect indepen-
dent sources of evidence with distinct time courses. An as-
sessment of the relative merits of these alternative accounts,
therefore, requires us to quantify the neural evidence in the
trial-by-trial variability of EEG activity that distinguishes be-
tween targets and lures in the lead-up to a recognition mem-
ory decision.
Quantifying neural evidence
Despite previous efforts to relate the familiarity and recol-
lection components of dual-process models to different (tem-
porally distinct) neural signals (Curran, 1999; Rugg & Cur-
ran, 2007), little is known about the actual dynamics of
information accumulation in recognition memory decisions
and how they relate to accuracy, response times (RTs), and
response confidence. Building on the success of machine
learning techniques in neural data analyses that have pro-
vided unique insights into the dynamics of cognitive pro-
cesses (Polyn, Natu, Cohen, & Norman, 2005; Norman,
Polyn, Detre, & Haxby, 2006; Ratcliff, Philiastides, & Sajda,
2009; Philiastides & Sajda, 2006; Ratcliff et al., 2016; An-
derson et al., 2016), we trained statistical classifiers on spec-
tral EEG features to track the neural dynamics of evidence
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accumulation during recognition memory decisions. A clas-
sifier’s ability to distinguish targets from lures can be di-
rectly compared to an individual’s recognition memory per-
formance through the use of receiver operating characteris-
tic (ROC) functions relating hits to “false alarms” (incorrect
classifications of lures as “old”). The area under an ROC
curve (AUC) serves as a convenient index of classification
performance, with an AUC of .5 indicating chance perfor-
mance and an AUC of 1.0 indicating perfect classification
(Fawcett, 2006). We previously used confidence ratings and
latencies for binary recognition memory decisions to gen-
erate ROC functions and showed a strong correspondence
between the respective AUCs in the dataset from which the
current dataset was derived (Weidemann & Kahana, 2016).
Here we assess the evolution of a neural signal indexing
evidence for the recognition memory decision by generat-
ing ROC functions from the outputs of classifiers that were
trained to distinguish targets from lures using spectral EEG
features from various intervals during the recognition period.
To reduce computational complexity and generate more reli-
able features for the classifiers, we aggregated the time bins
shown in Figure 3 by averaging them in groups of six, par-
titioning each recognition memory decision into six equal-
time bins (see Methods for details).
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Figure 4. (A) Areas under the ROC functions (AUCs) for
confidence ratings, response latencies, and EEG activity.
AUCs for conventional ROC functions are shown in gray
and those for conditional ROC functions based on only “old”
or “new” responses (or corresponding classifier output) are
shown in red and blue respectively. Error bars correspond
to 95% confidence intervals. (B) Scatter plots illustrating
the relationships between AUCs for either confidence rat-
ings (AUCC; left panel) or response latencies (AUCL; right
panel) and EEG activity (AUCEEG). (C) Scatter plots illus-
trating the relationships between conditional AUCs for either
confidence ratings (AUCC; top panels) or response latencies
(AUCL; bottom panels) corresponding to “old” (left panels)
or “new” (right panels) recognition decisions and EEG ac-
tivity (AUCEEG) for “old” and “new” classifications. Corre-
sponding correlation coefficients are indicated in the top left
of each scatter plot and the main diagonals are shown for
convenience.
Neural evidence across the entire recognition period.
For each participant, we trained a classifier on spectral EEG
features from all six time bins to confirm (in held out ses-
sions) that the neural signal in individual trials reliably dis-
tinguished between targets and lures (AUC = .71, t(131) =
34.59, SE = 0.021, p < .001; Figure 4A). Single-process
models of recognition memory commonly assume that evi-
dence for targets is more variable than that for lures (Wixted,
2007), with converging evidence for this assumption coming
from fits of detailed models of evidence accumulation (Starns
& Ratcliff, 2014; Starns, 2014; Ratcliff et al., 2016). Larger
target variability can result in increased AUCs that are based
only on “old” responses (or corresponding classifier output)
compared to those reflecting overt responses or classifier out-
put for “new” decisions only (Weidemann & Kahana, 2016),
but this pattern is also compatible with dual-process mod-
els. Conditional AUCs indicate how much signal the mea-
sure of interest contains for each response class (beyond the
signal contained in the binary classification of test items as
“old” or “new”; Weidemann & Kahana, 2016) and were con-
sistently larger for “old” classifications across all measures
(t(131) = 8.22–33.22, SE = 0.005–0.008, ps < .001).
In principle, a classifier trained on neural data to dis-
tinguish targets from lures may use different signals than
those which are most important for the individual’s recog-
nition memory decision. Indeed, it is unlikely that the coarse
measure of scalp EEG activity (compressed into power for
a small number of frequencies) could reflect the neural sig-
nals leading to the recognition memory decision with high
fidelity. In that light, it is of particular interest to what extent
the qualitative pattern of (conditional) AUCs is similar across
measures. Figure 4B illustrates similarly close relationships
between AUCs based on overt responses (AUCC and AUCL,
with the subscripts denoting confidence ratings and response
latency, respectively) and AUCs based on EEG-classifier out-
put (AUCEEG; r = .71 & .76, t(130) = 11.53 & 13.36, ps
< .001) We also observed strong correlations between con-
ditional AUCs based on overt responses and EEG activity
(Figure 4C; r = .17–.81, t(130) = 1.97–15.58, p ≤ .05).
Tracking neural evidence across time. Having estab-
lished a neural signal that reliably distinguishes between tar-
gets and lures and that strongly correlates with recognition
memory decisions, we next asked how this evidence accrues
over time. If different types of evidence accrue with distinct
time courses, this would lead to distinct relative contributions
at different points in the decision process. In dual-route mod-
els, these signals are assumed to reflect independent sources
of evidence and thus should give a distinct advantage to any
classifier trained on features from multiple time bins (which
would thus be posed to capitalize on both types of evidence to
boost performance), relative to classifiers trained on features
from a smaller portion of the recognition period. To test this
prediction, we compared performance for classifiers trained
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Figure 5. (A, B) AUCs for the EEG classifier as a function
of vincentized time bin (A) or fixed-length (100 ms) time
bin (B) for features from individual time bins (I) and for cu-
mulatively adding features from each time bin (C; top pan-
els). The bottom panels show the differences between AUCs
(∆AUCs). (C, D) AUCs for the EEG classifier as a function
of vincentized time bin (C) or fixed-length (100 ms) time bin
(D) when tested on targets that were previously recalled (R)
or previously unrecalled (U) and corresponding differences
(∆AUC). Mean times corresponding to vincentized time bins
are indicated on the abscissa in (A); because RTs differed as
a function of previous recall only ordinal time bin labels are
indicated in (C). Shaded regions correspond to 95% confi-
dence intervals.
on features from a cumulatively increasing number of time
bins to performance from classifiers trained on features from
individual time bins only. Figure 5A shows the correspond-
ing AUCs for these two types of classifiers as a function of
time, as well as respective differences (∆AUC). The AUCs
for both types of classifiers were very similar and increased
gradually with time (regression slopes and intercepts for both
were 0.02 and 0.59, respectively; corresponding r values for
classifiers trained on individual and cumulative features were
0.52 and 0.53 respectively, SEs = 0.001, ps < .001). The two
types of classifiers are identical for the first time bin and, in
the absence of over-fitting, the additional features used by the
cumulative classifier for later time bins cannot decrease clas-
sification performance relative to the classifiers using fea-
tures from only one time bin. At the last time bin, the num-
ber of features differ by a factor of six for the two classifiers
and, even though the features from earlier time bins clearly
contained relevant signal (as shown by reliable classification
performance for previous time bins), the difference in classi-
fication performance between the two classifiers was minus-
cule (∆AUC = .003 at the last time bin and < .01 through-
out). We observed the same pattern of results for fixed-lenght
(100 ms) time bins (Figure 5B; regression slopes were 0.006
and intercepts were 0.5 for both classifiers, with r = 0.61 for
the individual classifier and r = 0.60 for the cumulative clas-
sifier, SEs < 0.001, ps < .001; |∆AUC| < .006). This pattern
of results is what would be expected if the classifier output
reflected an integrated evidence signal as it accumulates in
the lead-up to a decision.
To properly assess this evidence against dual-route ac-
counts of recognition memory, it is important to link our neu-
ral classifiers to overt responses. Above we compared (con-
ditional) AUCs for memory decisions to those from classi-
fiers trained on neural features from all time bins (Figure 4).
Here we track the correspondence between brain activity and
overt responses across time by correlating the trial-by-trial
output of classifiers trained on individual time bins with sub-
sequent confidence ratings. If classifiers trained on features
from different time bins were picking up on different types
of relevant signals, we would expect the correlation between
classifier output and confidence ratings to peak whenever
each signal type provides maximal evidence (e.g., a peak
in correlation reflecting an early familiarity signal, followed
by another peak reflecting contributions from later recollec-
tive processes). From the perspective of a single, continu-
ously accumulating, memory strength signal, however, we
would expect gradually increasing correlations as a function
of time. Figure 6 shows positive and increasing correla-
tions (measured by Spearman’s ρ) for outputs from classi-
fiers and confidence ratings as a function of time (regression
slope and intercept were 0.43 and 0.22, respectively, r = .56,
SE = 0.002, p < .001).
Neural evidence as function of prior recall. Given the
converging evidence against dual-route accounts, we set out
to maximize our ability to detect any differential contribu-
tions from different kinds of processes by assessing the clas-
sifiers’ performance conditional on previous recall of tar-
gets (Chan & McDermott, 2007). Figure 5C shows that
AUCs from recalled trials exceeded those for unrecalled tri-
als across all time bins (ts(131) = 21.08–31.19, SEs = 0.003,
ps < .001) and that both types of AUCs increased with time
(regression slopes for both were 0.02 with intercepts of 0.54
and 0.61 for AUCs based on unrecalled and recalled targets
respectively). Furthermore, the differences between AUCs
based on recalled and unrecalled targets also increased with
time (regression slope and intercept for ∆AUC were 0.006
and 0.073, respectively, r = .27, SE < 0.001, p < .001).
Regardless of previous recall status, classifier performance
increased gradually with time as one would expect if evi-
dence accumulated continuously (but at different rates) for
both types of trials.
Because differential RTs for targets as a function of previ-
ous recall could have contributed to the differences shown in
Figure 5C, we also trained classifiers on 100 ms bins of spec-
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Figure 6. Mean Spearman’s ρ between confidence ratings
and output of the EEG classifier using features from individ-
ual time bins as a function of time bin. Mean times corre-
sponding to vincentized time bins are indicated on the ab-
scissa. The shaded region indicates the 95% confidence in-
tervals.
tral EEG features that we moved from probe onset in steps of
50 ms until the time window that ended at 650 ms after probe
onset. Again, AUCs from recalled trials exceeded those for
unrecalled trials across all time bins (ts(99) = 3.6–19.76,
SEs = 0.002–0.003, ps < .001) and both types of AUCs in-
creased with time (with regression slopes of 0.004 and 0.009
and corresponding intercepts of 0.5 for the AUCs based on
unrecalled and recalled targets respectively; corresponding
rs = .45 & .64, SEs < 0.001, and ps < .001). Also
as above, the differences between AUCs based on recalled
and unrecalled targets increased with time (regression slope
and intercept for ∆AUC were 0.004 and 0.003, respectively,
r = .53, SE < 0.001, p < .001). For both types of analyses,
evidence accrual for recalled and unrecalled targets appears
most consistent with the continuous accumulation of differ-
ent amounts (rather than different kinds) of evidence.
Discussion
Despite a long history of research on recognition memory,
there is considerable disagreement about the nature of the ev-
idence that allows us to distinguish repeated encounters from
novel experiences (Diana et al., 2006; Dunn, 2004, 2008;
Wixted, 2007; Wixted & Mickes, 2010; Squire et al., 2007;
Kirwan, Wixted, & Squire, 2010; Dede, Wixted, Hopkins, &
Squire, 2013; Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas et al., 2010; Malm-
berg, 2008; Merkow, Burke, & Kahana, 2015; Ratcliff et al.,
2016). By training multivariate classifiers to distinguish be-
tween previously studied and novel items based on spectral
EEG features recorded prior to the execution of a recognition
response, we were able to track the accrual of this evidence.
We found performance of classifiers trained on a small frac-
tion of the recognition period to be nearly identical to that of
classifiers that were able to also capitalize on features from
all previous time bins (Figure 5A–B). This suggests that the
classifiers directly tracked an evidence signal, rather than a
signal over which a decision process integrates to calculate
the accumulated evidence—an interpretation also supported
by the strong correspondence between classifier output and
overt responses (Figures 4 & 6) and by the increasing clas-
sifier performance as a function of time (Figure 5). These
findings, as well as the strong qualitative similarities between
classifier performance as a function of time for previously
recalled vs. not previously recalled targets (Figure 5C–D),
are difficult to reconcile with dual-route models that posit
different kinds of recognition decisions based on indepen-
dent and temporally distinct familiarity and recollection sig-
nals (Reder et al., 2000; Yonelinas, 2002; Diana et al., 2006;
Yonelinas et al., 2010).
Our work builds on and extends previous research linking
brain activity during an associative recognition task to hy-
pothesized processing stages (Anderson et al., 2016; Borst
& Anderson, 2015) and a recent study relating brain activ-
ity during a single-item recognition task to parameters in
a single-process recognition memory model (Ratcliff et al.,
2016). Whereas the former set of studies associated different
processing stages with separate familiarity and recollection
signals, Ratcliff et al.’s conclusions are largely compatible
with ours. Differences in tasks and analysis methods com-
plicate direct comparisons between these studies and our re-
sults, but to the extent that the familiarity and recollection
signals identified in the partitioning of EEG activity into pro-
cessing stages (Anderson et al., 2016; Borst & Anderson,
2015) are correlated, they would provide evidence for a uni-
tary recognition signal in our approach which would comple-
ment our conclusions (more on this below).
An advantage of our approach is that it does not depend on
the assumptions of any specific model of recognition mem-
ory, binary choice, or processing stages. By contrasting per-
formance of multivariate classifiers trained on EEG activity
during different partitions of the time between probe onset
and just prior to the recognition response, we were able to
show that “neural evidence” at any given time, incorporates
information from previous time points rather than reflecting
different kinds of independent evidence signals at different
time points. We were also able to directly relate classifier
performance and outputs to overt responses, suggesting a
close link between neural activity and recognition decisions,
as well as associated confidence ratings, that increased as
classifiers were trained on later time bins (Figures 4 and 6).
As we discuss next, to the extent that we are able to measure
all relevant neural signals and to the extent that any signals
reflecting independent evidence sources supporting multiple
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routes to recognition are temporally distinct, our results pro-
vide evidence for single-route models of recognition mem-
ory.
Does classifier output reflect recognition evidence?
We have used ouputs of multivariate classifiers trained on
spectral EEG activity to track evidence for recognition de-
cisions as it evolved in the lead-up to a response. Our con-
clusions are conditional upon this approach’s ability to faith-
fully reflect information that is relevant for the recognition
decision. Alternatively, our conclusion that a unitary evi-
dence signal drives recognition decisions could also be due
to our approach’s inability to detect neural activity associated
with a separate evidence signal. The strong correlations of
classifier output with overt responses offer some reassurance
by limiting the variance that could be explained by unob-
served evidence signals. Additionally, ERP analyses during
recognition decisions are often interpreted as reflecting con-
tributions of independent familiarity and recollection signals
(Curran, 1999; Rugg & Curran, 2007), which should render
these signals observable in our approach.
Might different evidence signals overlap?
Our analyses depend on different evidence signals exhibit-
ing distinct temporal profiles. Whereas many dual-process
models do not specify the dynamics of familiarity and recol-
lection, as discussed above, the near universal assumption is
that these signals are temporally distinct. It is generally as-
sumed that an early familiarity signal precedes a later recog-
nition signal, but the fact that responses that are thought to be
driven by a recollection signal are made quicker than those
thought to rely on familiarity has motivated proposals that
recollection occurs before familiarity (Dewhurst, Holmes,
Brandt, & Dean, 2006). This pattern of response times, how-
ever, is only at odds with an early familiarity and a late rec-
ollection signal within the framework of dual-route models.
If evidence from all sources is integrated into a unitary ev-
idence signal, as we propose, it is not meaningful to distin-
guish between “familiarity” and “recollection” responses and
we would expect response times to be predominantly a func-
tion of overall evidence strength. If memory probes which
elicit recollective experiences are generally associated with
higher levels of overall evidence (e.g., because recollective
evidence is considered particularly diagnostic), single-route
models could thus predict faster response times in situations
where specific episodic details were recollected, even if rec-
ollection signals occur later than familiarity signals.
Our approach is agnostic to the relative order of any fa-
miliarity and recollection signals, but to the extent that ev-
idence signals for different routes to recognition overlap in
time, we would not be able to distinguish them. Our results
are thus compatible with dual-route models, but only under
the assumption that recollection and familiarity signals are
observable in the EEG activity at similar times or that at least
one of these signals does not manifest in the EEG activity.
Likewise, if familiarity and recollection signals are highly
correlated, we would be unable to distinguish them in our
approach. In this case, however, it is unclear to what extent
this distinction is meaningful and one could conceptualize
these signals as manifestations of a unitary evidence signal
instead.
Novelty detection
Whereas we have considered different ways in which a
previously studied item might be recognized as “old”, some
evidence suggests that the detection of novelty can also sup-
port recognition memory (Daselaar, Fleck, Prince, & Cabeza,
2006; Davelaar, Tian, Weidemann, & Huber, 2011; Kafkas
& Montaldi, 2014; Bunzeck, Doeller, Fuentemilla, Dolan, &
Duzel, 2009). Our approach quantifies evidence distinguish-
ing between targets and lures and thus is agnostic with re-
spect to whether the relevant signals index familiarity or nov-
elty. It is likely that any familiarity and novelty signals would
be strongly (negatively) correlated in standard recognition
memory tasks, and some evidence suggests similar temporal
profiles for familiarity and novelty signals (Bunzeck et al.,
2009). Our approach does not distinguish between strongly
correlated and/or temporally overlapping signals and thus is
unable to differentiate familiarity and novelty signals with
these properties.
Conclusion
Debates about the relative merits of single- vs. dual-
process models often presuppose a false dichotomy between
a single route to recognition and contributions from multiple
sources of evidence (such as recollection and familiarity) to
recognition decisions. Indeed, whereas single-process mod-
els assume a unitary “memory strength” signal, models that
specify how this value is computed typically derive it from
multiple features. For example, the Retrieving Effectively
from Memory (REM; Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997) model rep-
resents probes as vectors of features and the recognition deci-
sion is based on a computation of the probe’s match to stored
memory traces. Thus, the memory strength signal in REM
depends on a range of factors (such as the similarity between
the probe and stored memory traces, the likelihood of cor-
rectly storing features during study, and how features might
get confused), but it is considered a single-process model be-
cause the effects of all of these factors culminate in a uni-
tary evidence signal. Models that assume separate familiar-
ity and recollection processes, on the other hand, are gener-
ally regarded as belonging to a different class of dual-process
models, even when they explicitly allow for the associated
memory signals to combine into a unitary evidence signal
(Rotello et al., 2004; Wixted & Mickes, 2010). As we have
argued above, we believe a more meaningful distinction is
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that between single and dual routes to recognition. Specif-
ically this perspective could help resolve apparent conflicts
between the success of single process models and evidence
suggesting the contributions of distinct sources of evidence
to recognition decisions.
There are inherent trade-offs between integrating all avail-
able evidence, and thus maximizing the ability to distinguish
old from new items, and separately considering different
sources of evidence, and thus maximizing the ability to qual-
ify recognition decisions (e.g., with remember-know judg-
ments). It is therefore possible that the extent to which evi-
dence from different sources is integrated into a unitary sig-
nal is sensitive to task demands (Rotello et al., 2004; Wixted
& Mickes, 2010). At least for the standard old-new discrim-
ination task considered here, however, our results indicate
that the memory system integrates available evidence into
a unitary evidence signal that drives recognition decisions.
These findings thus firmly link recognition decisions to other
types of decisions under uncertainty, which are commonly
assumed to rely on a unitary evidence signal differentiating
between the response options (Ratcliff et al., 2009; Nosofsky,
Little, & James, 2012; Philiastides & Sajda, 2006).
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